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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
On the evening of April 23, 1996, Laurie Latshaw 
telephoned Constable Albert Diehl and enlisted his aid in 
her plan to take a van from her former husband, Mark 
Abbott, the next day. Although Latshaw recovered the van, 
her plan was less than successful in that Abbott then filed 
an action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against her, Diehl, and 
three Greensburg, Pennsylvania, police officers who arrived 
on the scene to assist the constable, for violation of his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. 
The district court granted summary judgment and 
dismissed Abbott's claim against all of the defendants, 
determining that the law enforcement officers were entitled 
to qualified immunity, and that both the pleadings and the 
evidence failed to implicate Latshaw in any state action. 
Abbott appeals the district court's dismissal of hisS 1983 
claim against all of the defendants, as well as its denial of 
his motion to add a claim alleging a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. We will affirm summary judgment in favor of 
Officer Sarsfield and Officer Stafford of the Greensburg 
police department on qualified immunity grounds, but will 
reverse dismissal of Abbott's S 1983 claim against Diehl, 
Lieutenant George of the Greensburg police, and Latshaw. 
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We will also reverse the district court's denial of leave to 




Mark Abbott and Laurie Latshaw were married from 1983 
until 1993. Latshaw's father, Dale Feather, purchased a 
van with "GMAC" financing in 1989, and received a 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania certificate of title issued in 
his name. On November 18, 1991, Feather and Abbott 
signed a Bill of Sale in which Feather agreed to"grant[ ], 
sell[ ], convey[ ] and deliver[ ]" the van to Abbott "free and 
clear of all liens and encumbrances . . . subject to the 
Purchaser paying all of the loans and encumbrances levied 
against" it. Thereafter, Abbott and Latshaw used the van, 
but its title and registration remained in Feather's name. 
 
Abbott retained sole possession of the van after he and 
Latshaw were divorced in 1993. He had completely paid off 
the GMAC loan on February 25, 1994, but chose not to 
transfer the van's title and registration to his own name 
because by doing so he would have forfeited the van's non- 
transferable warranty. 
 
On April 23, 1996, Feather assigned the van's title to his 
daughter by writing her name and address on the reverse 
side of the Certificate of Title alongside his notarized 
signature. The next day, Latshaw took the document to 
Greensburg where a title service reissued the van's 
registration in her name. She then telephoned Albert Diehl, 
a Westmoreland County constable, and informed him"that 
[she had] the title to the car, it is signed over to [her] and 
that [she] needed help in retrieving it from Mark Abbott." 
She expected the constable to "tell Mark that, yes, the [van] 
was [hers] and [she] could take it and that was it." Latshaw 
admits that she contacted Diehl in his capacity as a 




1. The transcript of Latshaw's deposition reads as follows: 
 
       Q. Now, when you contacted Al Diehl, you were cont acting him as 
       a constable; is that correct? 
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On April 25, 1996, Latshaw and Diehl met outside 
Abbott's chiropractic office in Greensburg. Neither of them 
had notified Abbott of the impending seizure. As proof that 
she owned the van, Latshaw showed the constable the 
Pennsylvania certificate of title issued in her father's name 
and bearing a notarized assignment to her, a temporary 
registration issued in her name, temporary license plates, 
and an insurance card indicating that the van was insured 
by a policy issued to James P. Latshaw, presumably her 
husband. 
 
Convinced that Latshaw was entitled to immediate 
possession of the van, Diehl approached Abbott, identified 
himself as a constable, and asked him if he would give 
Latshaw the keys to the van. Abbott refused. He insisted 
that he had paid for the van, had driven it for seven years, 
and had a bill of sale at home establishing that he owned 
it. Abbott asked if he could drive the van home to get the 
proof of ownership, but Diehl threatened to arrest Abbott if 
he drove off in "her vehicle." Abbott then telephoned David 
Harr, the attorney who had represented him in the sale 
transaction with Feather. Harr told Diehl that the bill of 
sale existed, and warned the constable that he would be 
held liable if he helped Latshaw take the van. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Diehl telephoned the Greensburg 
police and requested that an officer come to the scene to 
review Latshaw's documentation. Lieutenant Dennis 
George, Officer Robert Stafford, and Officer Donald 
Sarsfield of the Greensburg police arrived on the scene in 
response to the call. They reviewed Latshaw's paperwork 
and confirmed by radio that the van was in fact registered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       A. Yes, I was. 
 
       Q. And did you pay him for his services? 
 
       A. Yes, I did. 
 
       Q. How much did you pay him? 
 
       A. $ 40. 
 
(Latshaw Dep. at 13-14). 
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to Dale Feather. One of them told Latshaw she was entitled 
to immediate possession of the van. 
 
David J. Millstein, Abbott's current counsel, arrived at 
the scene at about this time. He spoke briefly to Diehl, and 
then entered into a heated discussion with Lt. George in 
which he vehemently opposed the seizure. When words 
proved ineffective, Millstein took action. By then, a 
locksmith whom Diehl had recommended to Latshaw had 
cut a key to the van. Millstein boxed the van into its 
parking space with his car in order to prevent Latshaw from 
driving it out of the parking lot. According to the police 
report submitted by Stafford, Lt. George then threatened to 
arrest Millstein if he did not make way for the van. When 
Millstein refused to do so, Lt. George told him that he was 
under arrest. The Greensburg police officers then issued 
him a summary citation for disorderly conduct and briefly 
detained him in a police car. Meanwhile, Latshaw managed 
to maneuver the van around Millstein's car and drove off. 
 
Abbott commenced a 42 U.S.C. S 1983 action against 
Diehl, the Greensburg police officers, and Latshaw, 
claiming that they deprived him of property under color of 
state law without due process. The district court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 1343(a)(3), 
and 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Abbott now appeals from the July 
21, 1997, final order of the district court granting summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds in favor of Diehl 
and the Greensburg police officers, dismissing hisS 1983 
claim against Latshaw for lack of state action, and denying 
him leave to amend his complaint to include an alleged 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
 
We have jurisdiction to review the final order of the 
district court under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. In reviewing an order 
of summary judgment predicated on qualified immunity 
grounds, we exercise plenary review over the district court's 
legal conclusions. See Kornegay v. Cottingham , 120 F.3d 
392, 395 (3d Cir. 1997). We will affirm summary judgment 
if, after drawing all reasonable inferences from the 
underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, we conclude that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact to be resolved at trial, and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id. 
 




The district court held that although Abbott asserted a 
property interest upon which a S 1983 claim for violation of 
procedural due process may be predicated, qualified 
immunity shields the officers from potential liability for 
their role in the seizure. We agree with the finding that the 
officers were state actors and effected a constitutional 
deprivation, but part company with the district court on the 
issue of qualified immunity. 
 
A. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 
 
Section 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of 
federally secured statutory or constitutional rights"under 
color of state law." 42 U.S.C. S 1983. See West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Abbott alleges in his S 1983 claim 
that Constable Diehl and the Greensburg police officers 
violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due 
process by using the authority vested in Pennsylvania law 
enforcement officers to deprive him of property without 
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. If their 
conduct satisfies the state action requirement of the Due 
Process Clause, then it also qualifies as action"under color 
of state law" for S 1983 purposes. See Lugar v. Edmondson 
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 n.18 (1982). 
 
1. Constable Diehl and the Greensburg Police Officers 
 
Where, as here, defendants have successfully raised the 
shield of qualified immunity in a S 1983 action, an 
appellant trying to reverse summary judgment bears the 
initial burden of showing that the defendants violated a 
clearly established statutory or constitutional right. See 
Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing In re City of Phila. Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 961 (3d Cir. 
1995)). In particular, Abbott must establish that the officers 
were acting as state actors when they deprived him of a 
property interest to which he had a legitimate claim of 
entitlement without the process he deserved. 
 
a. State Action 
 
State action is a threshold issue in a Fourteenth 
Amendment claim. "[T]he deprivation must be caused by 
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the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State 
. . . or by a person for whom the state is responsible," and 
"the party charged with the deprivation must be a person 
who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar, 457 U.S. 
at 937. The traditional definition of action under color of 
state law is similar, and requires that one liable under 
S 1983 "have exercised power `possessed by virtue of state 
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law.' " West, 487 U.S. at 
49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 
(1941)). 
 
We need not dwell on whether Diehl and the Greensburg 
police officers were state actors. They were clearly invested 
with the power and authority of the state when they 
assisted Latshaw, and "state employment is generally 
sufficient to render the defendant a state actor." Lugar, 457 
U.S. at 935 n.18. In Pennsylvania, constables are elected 
public officials with prescribed duties and liabilities, see 13 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 1, 41, 45 (1998), and we likewise 
consider police officers to be a "set of state actors." 
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634 (1986). Diehl 
admits that he acted as a constable, and identified himself 
as such to Abbott. The other officers arrived on the scene 
in response to Diehl's call for assistance, and were on duty. 
All four law enforcement officers were clearly state actors. 
 
b. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right 
 
It is elementary that procedural due process is implicated 
only where someone has claimed that there has been a 
taking or deprivation of a legally protected liberty or 
property interest. See Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 
564, 569 (1972). It is also well established that possessory 
interests in property invoke procedural due process 
protections. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972). 
In Fuentes, the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment 
replevin procedures used by creditors to recover household 
goods purchased under conditional sales contracts and on 
which payments were allegedly overdue. "Clearly their 
possessory interest in the goods, dearly bought and 
protected by contract, was sufficient to invoke the 
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protection of the Due Process Clause." Id.  at 86-87 (footnote 
omitted).2 It is equally clear that Abbott's possessory 
interest in the van he had driven for seven years invoked 
the protection of the Due Process Clause. 
 
At the core of procedural due process jurisprudence is 
the right to advance notice of significant deprivations of 
liberty or property and to a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. See LaChance v. Erickson, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 
753, 756 (1998); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 
(1971). Prior notice is not, however, absolutely necessary so 
long as other procedures guarantee protection against 
erroneous or arbitrary seizures. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant 
Co., 416 U.S. 600, 605-606 (1974); Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 
F.2d 50, 58 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc). In Mitchell, the Court 
upheld a Louisiana statute requiring creditors to obtain 
judicial approval, post a bond, and submit a verified 
petition or affidavit before they sequestered property 
without notice from debtors entitled to seek immediate 
dissolution of the writ or to regain possession of the 
sequestered goods by filing a bond. Comparable procedures 
did not protect Abbott here. The Court has also found prior 
notice unnecessary in rare cases where (1) a seizure was 
directly necessary to secure an important governmental or 
general public interest, (2) there was a special need for very 
prompt action, and (3) "the State has kept strict control 
over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating 
the seizure has been a government official responsible for 
determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn 
statute, that it was necessary and justified in a particular 
instance." Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91. This rare exception to 
the general requirement of providing notice before state 
action deprives an individual of a protected property 
interest is also inapplicable here. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The defendants argue that Abbott had no property interest in the van 
because he did not list it among his assets in a prior bankruptcy 
proceeding, and is therefore judicially estopped from claiming he owns it. 
They also contend that his ownership of the van was uncertain because 
it was not explicitly awarded to him in the divorce proceedings. Because 
deprivation of a possessory interest alone invokes the right to procedural 
due process, we need not consider these arguments as to who owned the 
van. 
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Abbott has a strong claim against Diehl for violating his 
right to procedural due process by failing to give him 
advance notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to 
Latshaw's seizure of the van. The constable played a 
principal role in the seizure. Latshaw enlisted him, and 
paid for his help because she believed that she could not 
take the van from Abbott without it. According to Abbott, 
"Mr. Diehl walked into my office and identified himself as a 
constable and told me that he was [there to take my 
vehicle," and that "we're going [to] take the vehicle one way 
or another." The constable threatened to arrest Abbott for 
driving "her vehicle" if he tried to drive the van home. 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Abbott, we 
find that a reasonable jury could conclude that Diehl used 
his public authority to help Latshaw take possession of the 
van, and as such was obligated to notify Abbott of the 
seizure in advance and to provide him with a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. 
 
The Greensburg police officers were called to the scene to 
check Latshaw's documentation, which they did. There is 
no evidence that two of the officers -- Sarsfield and Stafford 
-- did any more than this. The mere presence of police at 
the scene of a private repossession does not, alone, 
constitute state action causing a deprivation of a protected 
property interest. In Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 
F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
declined to find state action on the part of police officers 
who arrived at the scene of a self-help repossession in 
response to a report regarding a disturbance, maintained 
the peace, but did not take sides or assist the private 
repossessor in any way. Id. at 511-13. Officers Sarsfield 
and Stafford confined their conduct to the routine police 
procedures of checking the vehicle registration, and cannot 
be said to have used state action to deprive Abbott of his 
due process rights. See United States v. Coleman , 628 F.2d 
961, 964 (6th Cir. 1980) (acquiescence by police does not 
transform private acts into state action; police presence is 
not necessarily encouragement). However, Lieutenant 
George did not remain neutral, but advised Latshaw that 
she had a right to immediate possession of the van. 
Lt. George also ignored Millstein's ardent protest of the 
seizure, and threatened to arrest Millstein if he did not 
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move his car to make way for Latshaw. Although he was 
not the instigator, a jury could find that Lt. George, by his 
conduct, joined forces with Diehl in the unconstitutional 
deprivation, going beyond the permissible conduct outlined 
in Menchaca. See, e.g., Booker v. City of Atlanta, 776 F.2d 
272, 274 (11th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff can withstand summary 
judgment if jury could find that police involvement 
constitutes intervention and aid). This affirmative 
intervention and aid constitutes a sufficient basis for a 
reasonable trier of fact to find that Lt. George played a role 
in the seizure and resulting violation of Abbott's 
constitutional rights. Sarsfield and Stafford are therefore 
entitled to dismissal of the claims against them, but 
Lt. George is implicated in the constitutional violation. 
 
2. Laurie Latshaw 
 
Although not an agent of the state, a private party who 
willfully participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials 
to deprive a person of a constitutional right acts"under 
color of state law" for purposes of S 1983. See Dennis v. 
Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980); Adickes v. S. H. Kress 
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); McKeesport Hosp. v. 
Accreditation Council for Graduate Med. Educ., 24 F.3d 519, 
524 (3d Cir. 1994) ("State action may be found if the private 
party has acted with the help of or in concert with state 
officials."). The district court dismissed Abbott's S 1983 
claim against Latshaw sua sponte because it found that his 
complaint failed to allege a conspiracy between Latshaw 
and Diehl, and that "the record reveal[ed] no basis to infer 
that any such allegation could withstand scrutiny." Abbott 
had alleged in his complaint that Diehl acted "at the 
instance and request of Defendant Latshaw" and that 
Latshaw was thus "acting under color of state law" for 
purposes of the lawsuit. Further, the complaint depicted 
joint action by Latshaw and Diehl in effectuating the 
recovery of the van. This is not a case in which the 
complaint contains conclusory allegations of concerted 
action but is devoid of facts actually reflecting joint action. 
See, e.g., Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 67 U.S.L.W. 3106, 3151 (U.S. Oct. 13, 
1998) (No. 98-219). Rather, the complaint easily satisfied 
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the standards of notice pleading; no more is required of a 
plaintiff in S 1983 cases. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168-69 (1993). The district court's dismissal sua sponte 
was improper because the pleading contained sufficient 
allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss. Further, we 
find the court's conclusion that the record contained no 
facts which could support a conspiracy allegation to have 
been premature -- since no motion for summary judgment 
had been filed -- but also curious in light of the facts borne 
out by the evidence, including Latshaw's statement under 
oath that she contacted Diehl and that she paid him to 
help her take possession of the van. (See Latshaw Dep. at 
14). We will therefore reverse the district court's sua sponte 
dismissal of Abbott's S 1983 claim against Latshaw. 
 
B. Qualified Immunity 
 
Qualified immunity shields public officials performing 
discretionary functions from S 1983 and Fourteenth 
Amendment liability "insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Our qualified 
immunity inquiry thus proceeds in two steps. See Sharrar 
v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 828 (3d Cir. 1997). First, we must 
determine whether the defendants violated "clearly 
established" rights. Second, we must decide whether, in 
light of the concrete, clearly established, and particular law 
applicable on April 25, 1996, and the information then 
available, a reasonable officer would have believed that the 
conduct of Diehl and/or the Greensburg police officers 
deprived Abbott of his right to procedural due process. See 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987); Reitz 
v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
It is readily apparent that the applicable law regarding 
procedural due process was "clearly established" at the 
time of the alleged violation of Abbott's rights. As we noted 
earlier, the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Fuentes held 
that due process protects possessory interests in property. 
407 U.S. at 87. Thus, the law in this area was clear for at 
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least twenty-four years prior to the incident involving 
Abbott and the defendants. 
 
However, resolution of the second element of the qualified 
immunity test is more complex. The district court 
determined that an objectively reasonable officer in the 
same situation would not have realized that the defendants 
were violating Abbott's rights, and ruled that Diehl and the 
Greensburg police officers were thus immune fromS 1983 
liability for helping Latshaw. The court held that an officer 
who had reviewed Latshaw's documentation would 
reasonably have concluded that she was entitled to 
immediate possession of the van. Therefore, it found, Diehl 
and the Greensburg police officers could not have believed 
they were denying Abbott due process of law. We disagree. 
 
The district court and the defendants rely heavily on the 
fact that under Pennsylvania law certificates of title 
represent "prima facie evidence of the facts appearing on 
the certificate." 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1106(c) (1998). 
However, the district court and the parties have overstated 
the importance of Latshaw's documentation, while ignoring 
the established precedent of Fuentes as well as the overall 
context of the seizure. 
 
At the heart of Fuentes is the principle that it is not for 
law enforcement officers to decide who is entitled to 
possession of property. Rather, it is the domain of the 
courts, and citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard as to their rights before they are finally deprived 
of possession of property. Diehl's curbside courtroom, in 
which he decided who was entitled to possession, is 
precisely the situation and deprivation of rights to be 
avoided. Diehl knew that Abbott had once been married to 
Latshaw and had been driving the van for seven years. 
Moreover, he had reason to believe -- based on the 
statements of Abbott, Harr, and Millstein -- that Abbott 
had a bill of sale at home to support his ownership of the 
vehicle. In his single-minded reliance on Latshaw's 
documentation, Diehl rode roughshod over Fuentes  and 
ignored the broader context of the seizure which militated 
against the legality and reasonableness of his hasty 
conclusion that Latshaw, not Abbott, was entitled to 
immediate possession of the van. An official familiar with 
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the facts then known and the law then applicable would 
have reasonably believed that his conduct was violating 
clearly established law. As such, we conclude that the 
district court erred when it granted summary judgment in 
favor of Diehl on qualified immunity grounds. 
 
We also conclude that an objectively reasonable officer 
would have realized the illegality of Lt. George's conduct. 
Reasonable police officers should know from the 
established precedent of Fuentes that their role is not to be 
participants in property deprivations without notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. There came a point during this 
incident when Lt. George's role changed from the protector 
of the peace to the enforcer. The Greensburg Police 
Department Supplemental Report indicates that Lt. George 
told Millstein that he would be arrested if he did not move 
his van, and states that, when Millstein refused to 
cooperate, Lt. George "grabbed" him by the arm and "told 
[him] that he was under arrest." (App. at 541). In light of 
Fuentes, we believe that a reasonable officer in Lt. George's 
position would have known that such behavior crossed the 
line of permissible conduct. We will thus reverse summary 
judgment on qualified immunity grounds as to Lt. George 
as well. 
 
III. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT 
 
The district court denied Abbott leave to amend his 
complaint to include an alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation based on its findings that the defendants did not 
"seize" Abbott's van, and that a Fourth Amendment claim 
"would be futile in light of the defendant officers' right to 
qualified immunity under the circumstances." We review 
the district court's denial of leave to amend a complaint for 
abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 783 
(3d Cir. 1982). However, we also recognize that"[i]f a 
district court concludes that an amendment is futile based 
upon its erroneous view of the law, it abuses its discretion." 
R.M. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 
180, 190 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, we find fault with both of the 
district court's rationales, and we conclude that the court 
abused its discretion in denying Abbott leave to amend. 
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First, in light of the Supreme Court's expansive view of 
the concept of "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, as 
set forth in Soldal v. Cook County, Ill., 506 U.S. 56, 61-65 
(1992) (a Fourth Amendment "seizure" of property "occurs 
when `there is some meaningful interference with an 
individual's possessory interests in that property,' " (citation 
omitted)), it is possible that plaintiff could in fact state a 
constitutional claim. Further, the district court's ruling as 
to qualified immunity, based as it is on the immunity issue 
relating to a due process violation, is not well-founded. The 
court opined that because qualified immunity applied to 
Abbott's due process claim, it necessarily would apply to 
his Fourth Amendment claim as well.3 Yet whether the 
defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from a claim 
under the Fourteenth Amendment is a wholly different 
inquiry from whether the defendants are entitled to 
qualified immunity from a Fourth Amendment claim 
involving the seizure of personal property. The latter inquiry 
involves whether, in light of clearly established Fourth 
Amendment law applicable on April 25, 1996, a reasonable 
officer in the position of Diehl and Lt. George would have 
believed that their conduct violated Abbott's Fourth 
Amendment rights. This issue has not even been raised, let 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's order of summary judgment in favor of Officers 
Sarsfield and Stafford, but will reverse the grant of 
summary judgment as to Constable Diehl and Lt. George. 
We will also reverse the district court's dismissal of Abbott's 
S 1983 claim against Latshaw, and its denial of leave to 
amend the complaint, and we will remand to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The district court made this determination without the benefit of any 
briefing by the parties. In opposing Abbott's motion for leave to amend, 
none of the defendants had argued that the amendment was futile 
because of the availability of a qualified immunity defense. 
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